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The Masked man fallacy, also known as the intensional fallacy or epistemic fallacy, is a form of logical fallacy that arises when one substitutes co-referential names in a statement within an intensional (context-sensitive) context. The substitution leads to faulty reasoning. This fallacy stems from the misunderstanding or misapplication of the identity of items or individuals due to a lack of detailed information or understanding about them.
The Masked man fallacy occurs in situations where someone wrongly concludes that two co-referential terms (terms that refer to the same thing) are not the same due to a lack of understanding about their referential nature. For example, if one knows a masked man is in a room and learns that their brother is in the house, assuming they are not the same person because the identity of the masked individual is unknown constitutes this fallacy. The underlying error is equating knowledge of attributes with the identity of the subject.
The Masked man fallacy can lead to misconceptions and faulty decision-making processes. It can cause individuals and organizations to overlook vital connections between seemingly disparate pieces of information, leading to errors in judgment and understanding.
To counteract this fallacy, one should emphasize the understanding of context and the nature of identity within statements. Critical thinking and questioning initial assumptions, as well as verifying the factual basis for identity claims, can help mitigate this fallacy. Educators and leaders should promote logical reasoning skills to support the accurate interpretation of statements.
Critics of focusing extensively on such fallacies argue that in practical scenarios, most individuals do not critically analyze identity-based propositions in-depth, and therefore the real-world impact might not as be pervasive as suggested. Moreover, some suggest that focusing on such fallacies exclusively overlooks the broader context of decision-making environments.
Identity, Substitution, and Rationalization
John A. Barker (1978)
Philosophical Review
The Epistemological Role of Equivalence Properties
Charles H. R. Brooks (1983)
Noûs